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THE USE AND INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION EIGHT OF THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION 1861-1984
RUTH A. MICKELSENt
Article I, section eight of the Minnesota Constitution, the remedies clause,
has seldom surfaced in supreme court opinions. Despite its limited use by
ltigants and the judiciay, however, the clause enjoys continued vitality.
Ms. Mickelsen's comprehensive histon'cal survey of section eight includes
discussion of the constitutional convention of1857, the 1984 Green-Glo
Turf Farms, Inc. decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and all of
the section eight cases in between. On the basis of her thorough survey,
analysis, and comparison with the Illinois and Wisconsin clauses, Ms.
Mickelsen ofers a prognosis for the Minnesota remedies clause.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. An Overview
Although most attorneys are familiar with the equitable maxim
"ubijus, ibi remedium,"I they may not be aware of a section of the
Minnesota Bill of Rights which contains similar phraseology. Ar-
ticle I, section eight (section eight), the remedies clause of the Min-
nesota Constitution, states:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property
or character; he ought to obtain justice freely and without
purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and with-
out delay, conformable to the laws.
2
During the last ten years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
expressed increased interest in the protections offered by this sec-
tion of the constitution. In 1974, a workers' compensation law ab-
rogating a third party's right to indemnity against an employer
was held to violate due process and section eight. 3 On two occa-
sions the Minnesota Supreme Court has sua sponte4 characterized
state statutes as creating "difficult" 5 or "grave ' 6 section eight
problems. Recently, section eight has been used to challenge im-
munities from tort liability. 7 The increasing use of the remedies
1. The phrase means "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." J.
EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 44 (1901).
2. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (1857, amended 1974).
3. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
4. Section eight arguments were not raised in the briefs. See Appellant's Brief and
Appendix, Haugen v. Town of Waltham, 292 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1980); Brief for Appel-
lant, Brief for Respondent, Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237,
241 N.W.2d 799 (1976).
5. Haugen v. Town of Waltham, 292 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. 1980).
6. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 240, 241 N.W.2d
799, 801 (1976).
7. See Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Minn. 1981) (Scott, J., dissenting); An-
derson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980); Cracraft v. St. Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1979) (Kelley, J., dissenting); Appellant's Brief at 12, Naylor v.
Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 1984); Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 10,
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clause by litigants and the Minnesota Supreme Court inspires this
survey and analysis.
An understanding of the court's interpretative struggle with this
constitutional provision requires integrating changes in legal phi-
losophy and theory during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The first section of this Article describes the transition from a nat-
ural rights to a positivistic approach and the accompanying
changes in judicial philosophy and activism. 8 The second section
explores the historical underpinnings of the Minnesota provision. 9
The third section presents and analyzes Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions involving section eight. 10 The fourth section compares
the Minnesota Supreme Court's use of the remedies clause with
interpretations of similar provisions by two other state supreme
courts." The last section offers a prognosis for section eight.' 2
B. Changes in American Legal Thought
An analysis of judicial interpretation of a historical document
such as the Minnesota Constitution requires some discussion of the
philosophical views of the time. H.L.A. Hart has characterized
American legal thought as traditionally "beset by two extremes,
respectively, the Nightmare and the Noble Dream.' 3  The
Nightmare views the distinction between legislators and judges as
mere illusion; judges actually create law when resolving disputes.
The view that judges create law is associated with principles of
legal positivism that permit or encourage judicial creation of new
social and economic rights. The Noble Dream conceptualizes
Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975); Respondent's Brief and Ap-
pendix at 5, Niing, Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae at 5-7, 16, Metig.
8. See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infa notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
10. See 'nfia notes 47-154 and accompanying text.
11. See tifra notes 180-239 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text. This discussion will concentrate on
judicial interpretation of article one, section eight, clause one, relating to a remedy for all
wrongs to persons, property, or character. Cases discussing the second clause of article
one, section eight, relating to the availability of free, prompt, and complete justice will not
be discussed. For a discussion of the second clause, see State v. Harris, 309 Minn. 395, 244
N.W.2d 733 (1976); Gram v. Village of Shoreview, 259 Minn. 145, 106 N.W.2d 553
(1960); Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259 (1946); Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn.
95, 147 N.W. 953 (1914); Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N.W. 53
(1896); Adam v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 365 (1862); Weller v. City of St. Paul, 5 Minn. 70
(1860).
13. Hart, American Junmpdence Through Engish Eyes. The Mightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 971 (1977).
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judges as never creating but only declaring the law they impose
upon litigants. This view has its roots in a natural rights
philosophy. 14
History reveals that the United States Constitution was based
on principles of natural law.15 Remarks of the Minnesota Framers
during constitutional debates indicate that they too accepted natu-
ral rights philosophy. 16 According to natural rights theory, rights
exist in and of themselves, derive directly from the ultimate struc-
ture of the natural world, and belong to individuals as part of their
intrinsic characters. 17 Governments can only codify, enforce, and
recognize rights; they cannot create them. This theory dominated
legal thought from the birth of the nation until the nineteenth
century. 18
The appeal of natural law doctrine to a "higher" law eventually
began to contrast sharply with statutes and other man-made
rules. 19 The natural law concepts of justice predominant before
1800 were gradually displaced by instrumentalists' ideas.
The revolt against natural law and the adoption of an instru-
mentalist outlook20 brought change to the methodology and char-
14. Id at 978.
15. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-
54 (1967); Viera, Rights and the United States Constitution: The Declension from Natural Law to
Legal Positivtrm, 13 GA. L. REV. 1446, 1447 (1979) (citing G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969)).
16. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text; accord MINN. CONST. preamble
(1857, amended 1974). The preamble acknowledges God as the source of "civil and reli-
gious liberty." Id
17. See 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 450-55 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). See
generally A. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(1951) (discusses theory of natural rights law).
18. See generally G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978) (col-
lection of essays on legal history).
19. The cohesion of these two ideas is evidenced by Thomas Jefferson's decision to
base the American claim for an independent nationality on the laws of Nature and Na-
ture's God. For comprehensive discussions of the natural law doctrine, see J. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 1-61 (1979); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1971); 1 M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILI-
ZATION (1967); Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in Ameri an Legal Histog: A Commentary on Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and on the Common Law in America, 53
IND. L.J. 449 (1978).
20. The important areas of private law-contracts, torts and equity-were altered in
the mid-1800's to inhibit interference in the relationship between public and private enti-
ties, including corporations and their employees. Private law, which had its origins in an
agrarian society of small enterprise and petty trade, could not survive in a system where
order of economic necessity was fashioned according to the demands of large commercial
enterprises. Equity, which originally allowed individuals to escape the feudal rigidity of
English common law and was infused into the individualism of American common law in
[Vol. 10
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acter of the common law. The general rules of precedent and
longstanding principles of construction, which limited judicial dis-
cretion within the common law process, made legislatures an im-
portant factor in the legal system. 21 Rules settled by practice
became, with time and statutory enactment, the laws of the land.
As other general customs fell into desuetude, changes in the law
occurred through the application of judicial discretion.
22
During the twentieth century, a private law developed which
focused on a movement from private to social rights. The individ-
ualistic ethic, which had emphasized the rights of property owners
and entrepreneurs, was replaced by a newer concept of law as a
mechanism for promoting social welfare. Legal realism acknowl-
edged the fallibility of the participants in the judicial process and
the principles of legal positivism finally came to predominate.
Legal positivism held rights to exist solely through laws enacted
by governments. Only by embodiment in law, via established pro-
cedures of a legal system, could rights have substantive content.
23
Nevertheless, legal positivism afforded the judiciary a flexibility
and potential for activism unforeseen by eighteenth century legal
scholars. Arguably, legal positivism allowed courts to create rights
and remedies when confronted with a "hard case" where no settled
rule or law applied. 24 Through legal positivism, other jurispruden-
tial movements developed which concentrated on the social out-
come and public policy impact of legal decisions. 25 The resulting
judicial activism and result orientation received much criticism.
For example, one commentator insisted that "[llegal positivism
and American constitutionalism are irreconcilable." 26 Despite
such criticism, however, judge-made law is generally accepted as
areas of business, labor, and property, did not serve well the interests of money and power
during the era of economic laissez faire.
21. Bridwell, supra note 19, at 491 n.117.
22. In Darwinism, legal rules and decisions were reflected in the balance of conflict-
ing interests, desires, and power forces at any one time, with the judge remaining neutral
by discounting his own references. Darwinism captured the essence of this rigorous intel-
lectual skepticism. See generally authorities cited supra note 19.
23. See 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 418-20 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). See
generally A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 17 (discussing natural law, positivism, and the ideal
law).
24. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978). The development of the
right of privacy is an example of this phenomenon.
25. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 98 (1936) ("[T]he practice
of law is a series of experiments, of adventures in the adjusting of human relations and the
compromising of human conflicts.").
26. Viera, supra note 15, at 1478.
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an undeniable reality.27
Judicial interpretation of section eight has reflected the evolu-
tion of American legal philosophy. Statements made by the Fram-
ers of the Minnesota Constitution during the natural law era
characterized section eight as a general principle.2 8 Early judicial
decisions emphasized that section eight principles would be
equally the law of the land even if not included in the constitu-
tion. 29 The courts avoided a positivistic approach, declining to
fashion new rights or remedies in difficult cases. This treatment of
section eight as a natural law principle was consistent with the
early nineteenth century belief that judges merely applied the law
and did not create legal rights.
In contrast, during the twentieth century, principles of legal pos-
itivism welcomed judicially created rights and remedies. 30 Eco-
nomic and social changes such as the introduction of workers'
compensation laws, the increased availability of other types of in-
surance coverage, and the creation of statutory rights and reme-
dies, dramatically altered the remedies available to litigants.
These social and legislative changes evoked a more activist role by
the judiciary than was probably contemplated by either the Fram-
ers or Justice Mitchell, who wrote that section eight "creates no
new legal rights or new legal wrongs and establishes no rule of
damages. It merely declares that for any wrong, recognized as
such by law, a person shall have a remedy ....
II. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO
SECTION EIGHT
A. The Hisloy of Section Eight
Although the Framers' subjective intent in adding section eight
to the constitution is largely unascertainable, the Framers proba-
bly were familiar with earlier documents calling for a remedy
upon the commitment of a wrong.32 A short historical survey
27. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1949) ("I take
judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."); M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 112-13, 121-24 (1967); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
28. See inra note 46 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
31. Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 261, 59 N.W. 1078, 1079-80
(1894).
32. The Magna Carta contained the following language: "To none will we sell, to
none will we deny, or delay, right or justice." S. KIMBALL, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
[Vol. 10
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reveals the Framers' lack of certainty as to the purpose and mean-
ing of the remedies clause.
33
Before Minnesota's admission to statehood in 1858, 34 an equal
number of Republicans and Democrats assembled to write a state
constitution. Political antipathy and mutual distrust caused Re-
publican and Democratic delegates to caucus separately and draft
two state constitutions.3 5 A conference committee drew up a com-
promise constitution. The compromise constitution was primarily
a distillation of various provisions from constitutions of several
other states.
36
The dual nature of Minnesota's constitutional convention re-
quires consideration of both parties' debates, since each party pro-
posed separate constitutional language. The Republicans
37
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 46 (1966) (quoting Magna Carta of 1215, ch. 40); see Appeal of
O'Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 165, 220 N.W.2d 811, 815-16 (1974) (Magna Carta concepts
are embodied in art. I, § 8).
While the idea originated with the Magna Carta, phraseology used by Sir Edward
Coke is considered the source of the language for the guaranty in many states' constitu-
tions. In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 311, 168 P. 53, 54-55 (1917); Note, A Remedy for all Injuries?,
25 CHI-KENT L. REV. 90, 96 (1947) (arguing that Coke's language is source for first part
of constitutional guaranty). Sir Edward Coke explained the pledge offered by the King in
the following language:
And therefore, every subject of this realme, for injury done to him in bonis, ter-
ris, or vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free,
or bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or
any other without exception may take his remedy by the course of the law, and
have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely, without sale, fully with-
out any deniall, and speedily, without delay.
Id. at 95-96 (quoting E. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 55-56
(1853)).
33. See Sheran, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in the Frontier Days of Minnesota. An Informal
Legal Histoy of the Years 1853 to 1865, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1976).
34. Act of May 11, 1858, ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285. For an excellent discussion of the
history of the Minnesota Constitution, see W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA (1921). See also 1 W. FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNE-
SOTA (1921); Anderson, The Constitution of Minnesota, 5 MINN. L. REV. 407 (1921) (con-
densed version of author's monograph); Note, Minnesota's First State Supreme Court (1858-
1865), And the Introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure, 11 MINN. L. REV. 93 (1927) (consti-
tutional provisions relating to judiciary).
35. For a discussion of the historical reasons for the bitterness and distrust between
the two political parties, see W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, supra note 34, at 45-47, 58-59, 70-
71.
36. Sheran, supra note 33, at 35-37. Minnesota's constitution appears to have been
patterned after those of New York, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa. See
Anderson, Minnesota Frames a Constitution, 36 MINN. HISTORY 1, 10 (1958).
37. See DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL. CONVENTION FOR
THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 105 (1858) (contains the debates of the 1857 Republican
Convention) (the remedies clause in the Republican Constitution was in section nine)
[hereinafter cited as DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS].
1984]
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originally proposed a more detailed form of section eight, 38 yet
questioned its necessity.39 The Democratic draft did not contain a
remedy provision,4° nor was one proposed or debated.41 Conse-
quently, the conference committee looked to the Republican draft
for the constitution's section eight language.42
According to the classic canons of constitutional construction,
38. Id. The original proposal read as follows:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
Id Mr. Aldrich, a Republican Representative, then moved to strike the words "being
obliged to" and the word "it." Id The last clause was thus amended to read: "he ought
to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly
and without delay, conformably to the laws." Id, see MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 8.
This version was adopted Friday, July 24, 1856. For a discussion of the value of the de-
bates as aids in interpreting the Minnesota Constitution, see infra note 42.
39. After the first reading of the section, Mr. Secombe, a Republican Representative,
made the following remarks:
It seems to me that the whole section is unnecessary. We have already declared
that men have certain inherent rights, among which are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness; and to secure those rights governments are instituted
among men, deriving theirjust powers from the consent of the governed. If these
are inherent rights and governments are instituted to secure them, does it not
follow as a natural presumption that persons are entitled to a remedy if deprived
of those rights?
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 105.
Mr. Secombe's argument is consistent with the Republican preamble which became
the preamble of the compromise constitution. See W. ANDERSON & A. LoBB, supra note
34, at 117. This preamble specifically recognized God as the source of civil and religious
liberties. Id For a general discussion of preambles, see Note, Statutes-Contracts-Constitu-
tions-Interpretations-Use of Aeambles or Recitals, 25 MINN. L. REV. 924 (1941). The Demo-
cratic constitution did not recognize God as the source of individual rights and did not
discuss such a statement. See W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, supra note 34, at 117. For the text
of the two constitutions, see id at 207-69, 278-85.
40. See W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, supra note 34, at 118.
41. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION INCLUDING THE ORGANIC ACT OF THE TERRITORY (1857) (contains the debates
of the 1857 Democratic Convention).
42. The dual character of the constitutional convention, makes the value of these
debates in construing various sections of the Minnesota Constitution unclear. One author
has stated: "When all the facts are considered, however, it is impossible to escape the
conclusion that the debates in the two wings of the Minnesota constitutional convention
have for legal purposes far less value than is ordinarily the case with constitutional de-
bates." W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, supra note 34, at 113.
Nevertheless, in Minnesota & Pac. R.R. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 1 (1858), Chief Justice
Emmett looked to the history of article nine, section ten, of the state constitution when
construing the meaning of that provision. Justice Emmett was a member of the Demo-
cratic Convention. Article nine, section ten did not, however, emanate from the constitu-
tional conventions, but from the first amendment to article six, adopted in 1858. Six years
later, Chief Justice Emmett again looked to the debates of the Democratic Convention in
[Vol. 10
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no section of the constitution can be considered superfluous. 4 3 A
constitutional provision is considered an "imperative mandate of
the sovereign people."'44 An understanding of the historical con-
text of and the debates preceding adoption of a particular section
generally facilitates constitutional construction. 45 Unfortunately,
the Framers' sketchy comments and the dual nature of the conven-
tion provide little insight into the intent or underlying rationale of
section eight. It appears that the Framers considered its inclusion
prudent, but neglected to identify the specific evils that the section
was designed to remedy. 46 Perhaps this lack of specificity is the
reason the Minnesota Supreme Court has never referred to the
constitutional history of section eight in its decisions.
B. Judicial Construction of Section Eight
Although section eight has been cited in over fifty decisions
since its original enactment more than one hundred years ago, it
has been expressly relied upon to strike down statutes or abrogate
immunities in only four cases. 47 This reluctance to rely on section
eight as legal support may stem from the court's perception of the
section as a general principle, rather than as a rule of law.48 It was
construing article six, sections seven and ten relating to the filling of judicial vacancies.
See Crowell v. Lambert, 9 Minn. 267 (1864).
During the next term of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Chief Justice Emmett was
succeeded by Chief Justice Wilson. Justice Wilson was a member of the Republican Con-
vention whose proposals were largely rejected by the conference committee. In Taylor v.
Taylor, 10 Minn. 81 (1865), Chief Justice Wilson stated:
It is also urged that the debates in the convention that framed the constitution,
show that the construction claimed by the plaintiff is the correct one. If such
debates could ever properly be resorted to as aids in interpretation, it seems quite
obvious that such a rule could not properly be followed in this case. The conven-
tion that framed this constitution divided on the first day of the session, forming
two organizations. . . . We think such debates should not influence a court in
expounding a constitution in any case.
Id at 99. Since Tayor, the debates have rarely been referred to in Minnesota Supreme
Court decisions.
43. See, e.g., Butler Taconite v. Roemer, 282 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1979); State ex
rel. Chase v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 220 N.W. 408 (1928).
44. Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 54, 287 N.W. 238, 241 (1939).
45. See, e.g., Lyons v. Spaeth, 220 Minn. 563, 567, 20 N.W.2d 481, 484 (1945); Stateex
rel. Chase v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410 (1928); State v. Peterson,
159 Minn. 269, 272-73, 198 N.W. 1011, 1012 (1924).
46. Cf In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 311, 168 P. 53, 55 (1917) (court commented that
English jurists did not agree on which evils the similar language in the Magna Carta was
designed to alleviate).
47. See infra notes 49-74, 98-102, 135-36 and accompanying text.
48. See generally C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 95-100
(1978) (many provisions of the United States Constitution state a rule, yet many constitu-
19841
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not until 1949 that the court formulated a test for evaluating sec-
tion eight challenges. Since then, statutes giving rise to remedies
clause problems have not always been reviewed by application of
this test. Instead, the common meaning of key words or phrases in
section eight are sometimes used to establish a constitutional
violation.
The following discussion divides section eight decisions into four
principal categories: cases approaching the provision as a princi-
ple; cases applying a test to evaluate a constitutional challenge;
cases focusing on construction of the provision's key words and
phrases; and cases concerning immunity from tort liability.
1. The Nineteenth Century Cases-Natural Law and Section Eight
The first case relying on section eight was Agin v. Heywara49 an
1861 decision written three years after Minnesota's admission to
statehood. In Agin, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
whether a district court's jurisdiction encompassed the enforce-
ment of a mechanic's lien for less than one hundred dollars. Arti-
cle VI, section five of the Minnesota Constitution specifically
granted original jurisdiction to district courts, in law and equity,
where the amount in controversy exceeded one hundred dollars. 50
Relying in part on section eight, Chief Justice Emmett con-
cluded that district courts had original jurisdiction in cases where
the Minnesota Constitution did not clearly confer jurisdiction on a
different court.5 1 The Chief Justice reasoned that since section
eight "includes the enforcement of rights as well as the redress of
wrongs," denial of jurisdiction would render the section
ineffective.
52
Straightforward interpretation of section eight characterized
Agz'n and other early remedies clause decisions. The Agin court
reasoned that the effectiveness of section eight would be limited if
judicial power could not be exercised because the lower court had
no jurisdiction. The court did not formulate a test or rule for de-
termining whether section eight had been violated. Instead, the
absence of a forum for claims of less than one hundred dollars led
tional guaranties, such as the guaranties of due process and equal protection, state princi-
ples and not rules).
49. 6 Minn. 53 (1861).
50. Id at 58.
51. Id at 62.
52. Id. at 59.
[Vol. 10
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the supreme court to extend district court jurisdiction to these
small claims, thus permitting the enforcement of these rights.
One year later, the court used section eight to declare a legisla-
tive act unconstitutional in Davis v. Pierse. 53 Davis involved the
constitutionality of a state statute suspending the privilege of all
persons supporting the Confederacy during the Civil War to prose-
cute and defend legal actions. 54 In condemning the act, the jus-
tices focused on the phrase "every person" finding that the section
was intended to benefit all citizens, even those residing in states
attempting to secede from the Union.55 The Chief Justice com-
pared the right to a remedy for all wrongs with the right to a trial
by jury, the right to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizures, and the right to just compensation upon the taking of
private property for public use.56 None of these rights was found
"more sacred to the citizen, or more carefully guarded by the con-
stitution, than the right to have a certain and prompt remedy in
the law for all injuries or wrongs to person, property, or
character.
'57
As in Agin, the Davis court was guided in its disposition of this
politically charged issue by the principles embodied in section
eight. 58 In holding that the statute violated sections seven, eight,
and eleven of article 1,59 the court did not formulate rules for de-
termining the constitutionality of legislation under these sections.
Instead, the court reasoned that the "chief end of all government is
the protection of the rights of all" 6 and that even without a consti-
tutional remedies provision, all members of society may rightfully
claim protection of their property.
61
In 1866, the supreme court in Baker v. Kelley, 62 used section eight
to declare unconstitutional a tax law requiring persons whose
53. 7 Minn. 1 (1862).
54. Id at 3; accord Jackson v. Butler, 8 Minn. 92 (1862); McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn.
91 (1862); Wilcox & Barber v. Davis, 7 Minn. 12 (1862).
55. 7 Minn. at 5-6.
56. Id at 6.
57. Id
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Id at 4-5. Section seven prohibited criminal charges from being issued without
indictment by grand jury. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 7. Section eleven prohibited
laws impairing obligations of contracts and ex post facto laws. Id. art. 1, § 11. The Davis
court found that the act in question contravened all three provisions of the constitution. 7
Minn. at 5. The analysis, however, involved only the language of section eight.
60. 7 Minn. at 6.
61. Id.
62. 11 Minn. 358 (1866).
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property was sold in a tax sale to bring an action testing the sale's
validity within one year. 63 Failure to bring an action within one
year forever barred a former property owner from his rights in the
property. 64 The limitations period commenced when the tax deed
was recorded, but the cause of action did not accrue until the
owner was ejected from the property, potentially an indefinite pe-
riod after the recording. Often, the limitations period could com-
mence before the property owner possessed the cause of action
necessary to toll the statute of limitations. The court saw that the
law's practical effect was to deny a remedy in a majority of cases.
65
In striking down the statute, the court distinguished between a
law operating merely as a statute of limitations and a law requir-
ing a party to bring suit to continue enjoying his rights as a prop-
erty owner.66 According to the justices, statutes of limitation were
valid exercises of legislative authority, acting to extinguish a rem-
edy once a full, fair, and impartial trial became improbable. 67 In
contrast, the challenged tax law compelled a property owner to sue
an adverse claimant to preserve the uninterrupted enjoyment of
his property, or forever be barred from asserting his rights as a
property owner. 68 The court deemed such a deprivation of prop-
63. Id at 371-74. The court also relied on the due process clause of the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. at 375-77.
64. Id at 367-68. In Baker, the plaintiff brought an action for ejectment from real
property. The defense to this action was possession of a tax title and the plaintiff's failure
to commence an action within one year after the tax deed had been recorded. Id. The
disputed sections read:
Sec. 6. That any person owning, or claiming any right, title, or interest, in or to
any land or premises so to be sold under the provisions of this act, shall, on or
before the day of the sale thereof, commence an action for the purpose of testing
the validity of the assessment of the taxes thereon, or in any manner questioning
the regularity or validity thereof, or otherwise asserting his right, interest, or
claim thereto, or be forever barred in the premises ....
Sec. 7. That any person or persons, having or claiming any right, title or interest
in or to any land or premises after a sale under the provisions of this act, adverse
to the title or claim of the purchaser at any such tax sale, his heirs or assigns
shall, within one yearfrom the tine of the recording of the tax deed for such premises, com-
mence an actionfor the purpose of testihg the validity of such sale, or be forever barred in the
premises.
Id. at 365-67 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 371. The court noted:
If this law required an action of ejectment to be brought within one year after
the cause of action accrues, there would, perhaps be some difference of opinion
as to whether that would be such a denial of the remedy as is inhibited by the
constitution; it would certainly be an advance towards that point.
Id
66. Id at 373-74.
67. Id. at 371-72.
68. Id at 362.
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erty rights to be beyond legislative authority.69
In its analysis, the Baker court presumed that the rights of prop-
erty owners were guaranteed by natural law. 70  The legislature
could not require property owners who possessed their property to
bring an action to vindicate their property rights. 71 Since the leg-
islature could not require a property owner to commence an ac-
tion, the court reasoned that failure to do what could not be
required would not bar a property owner's otherwise valid law-
suit. 72 In contrast to later decisions discussed below,73 the Baker
court ruled that the legislature could not enact laws effectively de-
priving citizens of rights guaranteed by natural law.7 4
Three years later in Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 75 the court refused
to declare a libel act unconstitutional because it limited various
common law remedies. 76 The disputed law prohibited the recov-
ery of general damages upon proof of publication alone, and lim-
ited the recovery of special damages to specified cases. 77 Chief
Justice Mitchell, writing for the majority, stated that the constitu-
tional guaranty of a certain remedy at law for all injuries to per-
son, property, or character was but "declaratory of general
fundamental principles, founded in natural right and justice, and
which would be equally the law of the land if not incorporated in
the constitution." 7
8
Treating the remedies clause as a declaration of general princi-
ples, the Allen court viewed section eight as too uncertain and in-
definite to form rules for judicial decisions in all cases. 79 Chief
Justice Mitchell saw such principles as "guides to legislative judg-
ment, rather than as absolute limitations of their power." 80 The
69. Id at 372-74.
70. Id at 374.
71. Id at 372-73.
72. Id at 373.
73. See intfa notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
74. 11 Minn. at 374-77.
75. 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889) (Mitchell, J.).
76. Id at 121, 41 N.W. at 937.
77. Id
78. Id at 122, 41 N.W. at 938; accord Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 105-06,
137 N.W. 390, 394 (1912); Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 56-57, 114 N.W. 353,
356 (1907); Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 263, 59 N.W. 1078, 1081
(1894).
79. 40 Minn. at 123, 41 N.W. at 938.
80. Id. Chief Justice Mitchell wrote:
There is unquestionably a limit in these matters, beyond which if the legislature
should go, the courts could and would declare their action invalid. But inside of
that limit there is, and necessarily must be, a wide range left to the judgment and
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court reasoned that what constitutes "an adequate remedy" or a
"certain remedy" was not determined by an inflexible constitu-
tional rule, but was subject to variation and modification as soci-
ety changed.8' Therefore, the legislature was given wide latitude
to determine the form and measure of a remedy.
8 2
In contrast to Baker, the statute challenged in Allen limited, but
did not preclude, a specific common law remedy. While in Baker
the disputed tax law eliminated the property owner's right to un-
interrupted enjoyment of his property, in Allen the right to obtain
redress for libel remained even though the remedy had been lim-
ited by legislative act. Consequently, the Allen plaintiffs continued
to possess the "certain remedy" required by section eight.
These nineteenth century decisions approached section eight as
a legal principle that would have been equally the law of the land
even if it had not been included in the constitution. As a declara-
tion of natural law, the court deemed the remedies clause too in-
definite to form inflexible rules. It resolved each case by applying
section eight's principles to the specific facts and analyzing them to
determine whether a remedy for a wrong was completely lacking.
Only where no remedy remained did the court strike down the
disputed legislative provision.
2. The Twentieth Centuy Cases-Development of a Rule of Law
In most cases since Alen, judicial deference to legislative author-
ity has been accompanied by judicial characterization of section
eight as a principle. This approach has produced numerous un-
successful section eight challenges.8 3 In most of these cases, section
discretion of the legislature, and within which the courts cannot set up their
judgment against that of the legislative branch of the government. These consti-
tutional declarations of general principles are not, and from the nature of the
case cannot be, so certain and definite as to form rules for judicial decisions in all
cases, but up to a certain point must be treated as guides to legislative judgment,
rather than as absolute limitation of their power.
Id. at 122-23, 41 N.W. at 938.
81. Id at 123, 41 N.W. at 938.
82. Id
83. See Wulffv. Tax Ct. of App., 288 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1979) (legislation requiring
transfer of tax cases from district court to tax court of appeals); Gram v. Village of
Shoreview, 259 Minn. 145, 106 N.W.2d 553 (1960) (statute permitting trial courts to re-
quire plaintiff to furnish surety bond); Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.,
243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1955) (application of doctrine of forum non conveniens);
State v. International Harvester Co., 241 Minn. 367, 63 N.W.2d 547, appeal denied, 348
U.S. 853 (1954) (statute requiring employers to continue to pay employees while exercis-
ing voting rights in federal, state, and local elections); State ex rel. Kane v. Stassen, 208
Minn. 523, 294 N.W. 647 (1940) (repeal of statutory right of mandamus); Minnesota
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eight was asserted as an alternative to federal or state due process
theories. When state and federal claims were made, the poten-
tially determinative federal claims usually were examined first.
Consequently, the court did not provide separate section eight
analyses. If the challenged statute satisfied minimum require-
ments of federal equal protection or due process, it generally was
held to satisfy section eight. This approach was common to other
state courts and has contributed to the limited development of
state constitutional law.
8 4
In 1949, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court formulated a
rule for measuring section eight challenges. In Breimhorst v. Beck-
man, 8 5 the court adopted an "adequate substitute" standard of re-
view for the remedies clause. The plaintiff in Breimhorst argued
that a workers' compensation statute eliminating a common law
remedy for serious disfigurement deprived him of an adequate
remedy.8 6 In articulating the standard, the court stated that the
legislature could abrogate a common law remedy without violat-
ing section eight, if it substituted an adequate remedy for the dis-
carded common law remedy.8 7  When the Breimhorst court
announced this rule, it relied on language from Allen v. Poneer-Press
Co. characterizing section eight as a mere declaration of general
principles."" Notwithstanding the Brez'mhorst court's adoption of a
Wheat Grower's Coop. Mktg. Ass'n v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 203 N.W. 420 (1925)
(Cooperative Marketing Act allowing formation of voluntary farmer associations for pur-
pose of introducing direct marketing concepts); Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96,
137 N.W. 390 (1912) (provision of Minnesota Torrens Act); Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn.
542, 57 N.W. 212 (1893) (constitutional provision exempting members of Minnesota Leg-
islature from arrest during legislative session).
84. See Project Report, Toward An Activist Role For State Bill Of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 271, 286-87 (1973).
85. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
86. Id at 429, 35 N.W.2d at 732.
87. Id at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735. The Breimhorst court first balanced the advantages
and disadvantages of the Workers' Compensation Act to an injured employee. Id at 429,
35 N.W.2d at 732. The court concluded that the elimination of an employee's common
law cause of action for permanent disfigurement, where disfigurement did not interfere
with employability, did not violate the plaintiff's entitlement to a certain remedy for all
injuries and wrongs. Because the Act provided an adequate substitute for the common
law or statutory action for damages, section eight was not violated. Id. at 436, 35 N.W.2d
at 735.
88. The Breimhorst court relied on the following language from Allen v. Pioneer-Press:
These constitutional declarations of general principles are not, and from the na-
ture of the case cannot be, so certain and definite as to form rules for judicial
decisions in all cases, but up to a-certain point must be treated as guides to
legislative judgment, rather than as absolute limitations of their power.
Id at 435, 35 N.W.2d at 735 (quoting Allen, 40 Minn. at 122, 41 N.W. at 938); cf. C.
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section eight standard of review, its reference to Allen indicated
that its basic view of section eight as a principle remained
unchanged.
Twenty-three years later,89 in Haney v. International Harvester Co., 90
the court announced a more liberal rule than the one in
Breimhorst. 91 In Haney, an employee covered by workers' compen-
sation insurance sued a third-party tortfeasor. The third-party
tortfeasor joined the plaintiff's employer as a third-party defend-
ant for purposes of contribution and indemnity.9 2 The plaintiff's
employer argued that he should not be joined because his common
law liability had been extinguished by workers' compensation
laws.
9 3
The court acknowledged that the workers' compensation laws
had eliminated the third-party's common law right to contribu-
tion.94 It then espoused a new standard for evaluating section
eight claims: "[a] common-law right of action may be abrogated
without providing a reasonable substitute if a permissible legisla-
tive objective is pursued. ' 95 In applying this rule, the court found
the legislature had neither substituted a reasonable remedy nor
pursued a permissible objective when it eliminated the common
DUCAT,supra note 48, at 100 (arguing that principles often underlie rules or are contained
in rules).
89. It is not surprising that almost a quarter of a century passed before the court was
again confronted with a section eight issue. The incorporation of federal protections ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment resulted in the neglect of rights
independently secured by state constitutions. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 HAstV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Instead, litigants benefited from
expansion of federal due process and equal protection principles during the activist years
of the Warren Court. Federal jurisprudence alone provided ample protection for individ-
ual liberties. See Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties.- State Court Protection of Pohtcal and Civil
Rights, 10 GA. L. REV. 533, 550 (1976).
90. 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972).
91. In Haney, the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act indirectly abrogated a third
party's common law right to contribution or indemnity from a negligent employer. The
court refrained from directly finding such an abrogation and remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the comparative negligence of the parties. Id. at 386-87,
201 N.W.2d at 146-47.
92. Id. at 377, 201 N.W.2d at 141.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 383, 201 N.W.2d at 145.
95. Id at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146. The Haney court perhaps viewed the question of
abrogation of a common law remedy as strictly a due process issue. See id. But cf Carlson
v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974). In Carlson, the court held a section of
the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act unconstitutional in the face of an article one,
section eight attack, because it extinguished a third party's common law right of indem-
nity without providing a reasonable substitute or pursuing a legitimate legislative objec-
tive. Id at 369, 215 N.W.2d at 620.
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law right.96 Despite its conclusion that the section eight test had
not been satisfied, the court declined to rule on the constitutional
issue and remanded the case for a determination of the compara-
tive negligence of all parties.
97
Two years later, in 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
the same standard to circumstances similar to those in Hane. In
Carlson v. Smogard, 98 the justices considered the constitutionality of
a workers' compensation law extinguishing a third-party
tortfeasor's common law right to indemnity from an injured
worker's employer. 99 They stressed that the legislature intended
the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act to control only the
rights between employers and employees;l°0 third-party indemnifi-
cation against employers was independent of the Act. Thus, the
justices concluded that the Act abrogated the common law right of
indemnification without including a reasonable substitute within
the workers' compensation laws or pursuing a permissible legisla-
tive objective.' 0 ' The statute was held to violate the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and section eight of the Minnesota Constitu-
96. 294 Minn. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146.
97. Id. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146-47.
98. 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
99. Id. at 366, 251 N.W.2d at 618. The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether
subdivision ten of Minnesota Statutes section 176.061 violated the due process clause of
the United States Constitution and article one, section eight of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Minnesota Statutes section 176.061, subdivision 10 provided:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the em-
ployer, or both jointly against a third person, results in judgment against such
third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no
liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgments or
settlements in absence of a written agreement to do so executed prior to the
injury.
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(10) (1971) (repealed 1976). In Carlson, the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of Quality Mercury and the defendant a customer of Quality Mercury. The plain-
tiff suffered a heart attack while driving the defendant's car in the course of his
employment with Quality Mercury. He sued the defendant, alleging that the sole proxi-
mate cause of his injuries was the defendant's negligence in installing a homemade locking
device on the hood of his car. 298 Minn. at 365, 215 N.W.2d at 617. The defendant
denied all negligence, asserting that the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was the
negligent conduct of Quality Mercury, and sought indemnification and contribution from
Quality Mercury. Id The trial court had disallowed the defendant's claim for indemnifi-
cation pursuant to the statute quoted above. Id.
100. 298 Minn. at 368, 215 N.W.2d at 619.
101. The court stated that "[t]he result would be that a common-law right of action
will be abrogated without providing a reasonable substitute. No legitimate objective is
fostered by preventing indemnification to a third-party tortfeasor from a negligent em-
ployer. No substitute remedy has been provided to Smogard." Id at 368-69, 215 N.W.2d
at 619.
17
Mickelsen: The Use and Interpretation of Article I, Section Eight of the Min
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tion.102 Carlson was the last decision to apply the Haney rule to
declare a statute unconstitutional.
Since Carlson, plaintiffs challenging workers' compensation laws
have not succeeded on claims that the legislature eliminated a
common law right without providing a reasonable substitute or
pursuing a permissible objective. The following cases demonstrate
the difficulty of succeeding on a section eight challenge when the
legislature retains any remedy whatsoever. They also evidence the
court's reluctance to interfere with legislative schemes regulating
complex social or political problems.
In Tracy v. Streater Lition Industries, 103 the court upheld a statute
permitting an injured employee to collect permanent partial bene-
fits while receiving temporary disability benefits.10 4 While apply-
ing the Haney test, the court viewed the entire statutory scheme as
a substitute remedy and refused to condemn the legislature for
failing to provide a remedy-for-remedy exchange.10 5 Similarly, in
Tri-State Insurance Co. v. Bouma, 106 the court declined to declare a
workers' compensation statute unconstitutional. The Tri-State
court found a permissible legislative objective was pursued by not
requiring injured employees to reimburse insurance overpayments
received in good faith.1 0 7 It further noted that in many cases the
insurance company could obtain restitution.10 8 Finally, the court
rejected section eight as an absolute limitation on the legislature's
power to determine the form and measure of a remedy for a
wrong.
The outcomes in Tri-State and Tracy are consistent with the
court's earlier statement that what constitutes an "adequate" or
"certain" remedy is not governed by an inflexible constitutional
102. Id at 369, 215 N.W.2d at 620. Only once has article one, section eight been used
as the sole basis for declaring a legislative act unconstitutional. See Agin v. Heyward, 6
Minn. 53, 59 (1861) (art. I, § 8 assures every person a particular remedy in the law; there-
fore district court had jurisdiction over controversy unless constitution provided other-
wise). Compare Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 358, 376-77 (1866) (act violated MINN. CONST.
of 1857, art. 1, §§ 2, 8, the remedies and state due process clauses) with Davis v. Pierse, 7
Minn. 1, 4-5 (1862) (act violated MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. 1, §§ 7, 8, 11).
103. 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979).
104. Id. at 914. Carlson was not considered binding precedent because the challenged
statute in Tracy concerned only the employee and employer. Third party rights were not
involved.
105. Id. at 915.
106. 306 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1981).
107. Id
108. Id. at 566.
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rule. 10 9 The liberal Haney standard of review accords the court
maximum flexibility to modify the meaning of these terms to ac-
commodate a changing society.
The Haney test was recently applied in Calder v. Cy of Cryslal 110
In Calder, city residents sought to recover for property damage
caused by a defective water drainage system."' They argued that
the applicable statute of limitations violated section eight by pro-
viding an unreasonably short period in which to join third parties
for contribution or indemnity."12 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim, noting that statutes of limitation were generally deemed
constitutional because they fulfilled the permissible legislative ob-
jective of extinguishing stale claims." 13 Thus, the court distin-
guished a substantive statute of limitations from a procedural one,
like that contained in Baker, which made a remedy impossible to
achieve. " 14
Calder exemplifies the court's practice of balancing the impor-
tance of the permissible legislative objective against the impor-
tance of retaining a remedy. In balancing these countervailing
interests, the court held that the importance of extinguishing stale
claims outweighed the hardship to plaintiffs of a shortened limita-
tions period.''
5
109. Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 122, 41 N.W. at 936, 938 (1889).
110. 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982).
111. Id at 839.
112. Id
113. Id at 844; see Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 358, 371-72 (1866). But see Kittson
County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 240, 241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (1976)
(statute of limitations should be construed narrowly when necessary to avoid constitu-
tional questions despite legislative objective).
114. 318 N.W.2d at 844.
115. Id.;cf Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d
799 (1976). In Kit/son County, the plaintiff challenged a statute of limitations relating to
building contractors. Id. at 237, 241 N.W.2d at 799. The statute barred actions for
breach of a building contract or breach of warranty brought over two years after discovery
of the breach or over ten years from the completion of the construction. The court upheld
the statute by construing it narrowly to avoid its application. Id at 240-41, 241 N.W.2d at
801. The court indicated, however, that the short duration of the two-year "discovery
period" and the "absolute nature of the ten year nullification provision which applied
despite a total lack of notice" of a defective condition, might create "grave" section eight
problems. Although statutes of limitations are usually deemed reasonable exercises of leg-
islative authority, apparently the court was reluctant to sanction one that could expire
before the injured party became aware of a building defect. Id. at 240, 241 N.W.2d at
802. Instead, the court held that the statute did not apply to actions sounding in breach of
contract and in warranty where the plaintiff is in privity with the defendants. Id. Such an
action was held to be governed by the six-year general statute of limitations. Id at 243,
241 N.W.2d at 802.
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The majority of decisions applying the Haney test have upheld
the challenged statutes. Given the heavy burden of proof in con-
stitutional cases and the deference accorded legislative action, such
a result is not surprising. Although these decisions articulate an
adjudicative rule, the rule requires the court to balance the con-
cerns of both parties with the principles of section eight. Formu-
lating a rule that requires judicial determination of the
"reasonableness" of a substitute remedy and the "permissibility"
of a legislative objective inevitably transforms an adjudicative rule
into a balancing process. This balancing process is characteristic
of judicial application of legal principles and enables the court to
use section eight to respond creatively to particular problems.1 16
Although the majority of decisions applying the Haney test have
not yielded favorable outcomes for plaintiffs, this should not dis-
courage future plaintiffs from pursuing a section eight theory. A
standard of review which requires the balancing of interests is an
inherently flexible standard. This flexibility should encourage liti-
gants to pursue a section eight theory in factually unique
situations.
3. Key Words and Phrases-A Textual Approach
A useful technique for developing a constitutional provision is to
explore the linguistic variation between federal and state constitu-
tional counterparts.' 17 Although section eight has no federal coun-
terpart, a linguistic or textual approach is equally useful.
In its judicial interpretation of section eight, the court has peri-
odically focused on its key words and phrases. For example, in
Davis v. Pierse,118 the court construed the phrase "every person."
The court interpreted this phrase to mean all persons residing
within the state, but noted it was "not to be taken in its broadest
sense, as that would include aliens, enemies, as well as friends." 11 9
Later, in Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 120 Justice Mitchell focused on the
phrase "certain remedy" when determining the constitutionality
of a libel law limiting recovery of special damages and prohibiting
recovery of general damages in particular circumstances. Justice
116. See generally C. DUCAT, supra note 48, at 105 (argues that balancing of interests,
rather than strict application of rules allows courts to formulate particular solutions to
unique problems).
117. See Project Report, supra note 84, at 315.
118. 7 Minn. 1 (1862).
119. Id. at 5.
120. 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889).
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Mitchell determined that these limitations did not offend section
eight's principles which were not "so certain and definite as to
form rules for judicial decisions in all cases."
' 12'
More recently, in Haugen v. Town of Waltham, 122 the court sus-
pended enforcement of a section of Minnesota's No-Fault Insur-
ance Act pending further legislative enactments establishing
guidelines for its effective administration. 123 The court found that
the lack of legislative guidelines made a statutorily mandated de-
duction of no-fault economic loss benefits inequitable for successful
litigants. 24 The section eight challenge focused on the absence of
the plaintiff's no-fault carrier as a party to the action, which could
have forced the plaintiff to relitigate his claim under the arbitra-
tion provisions of the insurance policy if the no-fault carrier con-
tested the damage award.1 25 According to the court, the potential
for relitigation "face[d] a difficult constitutional barrier in Minne-
sota," 26 because section eight required "a certain remedy in the
laws" that "completely" allowed a person to obtain justice.
127
In Haugen, the court did not formulate a new test for section
eight challenges, nor did it apply the Hane test.' 28 Instead, it fo-
cused on the practical consequences of the challenged legislation
which it measured against a common sense interpretation of the
section's language. 29 The court viewed the plaintiff's remedy in
Haugen as "incomplete" and "uncertain.' 30 It observed that the
language of section eight was singular, not plural, and that the
"constitution seem[ed] to contemplate a single remedy and not a
series of remedies."' 1
3'
As discussed in section III of this Article, 32 the Illinois and Wis-
consin courts have concentrated on the key words and phrases in
their remedies provisions. These courts have shown that more ac-
tive use of a remedies provision does not require formulation of a
rigid standard of review. A narrow focus on key terminology per-
121. Id. at 123, 41 N.W. at 938.
122. 292 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1980).





128. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
129. 292 N.W.2d at 740.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See infra notes 223-33 and accompanying text.
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mits conflict resolution without creating precedent that must be
steadfastly followed or painstakingly distinguished in later cases.
4. The Immunity Decisions
In recent years, the court has consistently cited section eight in
cases addressing immunity from tort liability. This trend contrasts
with earlier decisions which refrained from using section eight to
confer new rights or abrogate common law immunities. For exam-
ple, in 1914, the court upheld a common law rule precluding mar-
ried women from maintaining civil actions against their husbands
for tortious conduct committed during coverture. 33 Similarly, in
1935, the court refused to create a cause of action to compensate
wives for injuries inflicted on their husbands by third parties. In
both cases, the court concluded that the absence of a common law
right did not offend section eight.
1 34
In the 1930's, however, the court began to use section eight to
eliminate common law immunities that prohibited suits against
the sovereign. For example, in State ex rel Benson v. Stanley, 135 the
court relied on article one, sections seven, eight, and thirteen of the
Minnesota Constitution to hold that a landowner, whose property
was damaged by state highway construction and who was omitted
from the condemnation proceeding, could have his land included
for purposes of a damage assessment, notwithstanding that com-
mon law sovereign immunity would probably bar such relief.
136
In Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 137 section eight was cited to sup-
port a holding that a municipal official who maliciously evicted a
pauper from his home was personally liable for all actual and pu-
nitive damages resulting from his acts.1
38
State sovereign immunity for torts was abolished in Nieting v.
Blondell 139 In abrogating sovereign immunity, the Nieting court
133. Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922), overruled in,
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 266, 273 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969).
134. Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935), overruled bi, Thill
v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 514, 170 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1969).
135 188 Minn. 390, 247 N.W. 509 (1933).
136. Id. at 393, 247 N.W. at 510; see also State ex re. Peterson v. Anderson, 220 Minn.
139, 19 N.W.2d 70, 74-75 (1945) (quoting State ex rel. Benson v. Stanley, 185 Minn. 390,
394, 247 N.W. 509, 510 (1933)).
137. 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944).
138. Id at 230-31, 14 N.W.2d at 407-08.
139. 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
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relied on section eight's 140 premise that "one of the paramount in-
terests of the members of an organized and civilized society is that
they be afforded protection against harm to their person, proper-
ties, and characters.' 14 1 The court concluded that an individual
must have a "reasonable and adequate remedy against the wrong-
doer.' 1 42 In the later decision of Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 143
the court stated in dicta that absolute sovereign immunity from
liability violated section eight.
144
140. See id. at 131, 235 N.W.2d at 602. The opinion does not refer specifically to sec-
tion eight.
141. Id
142. Id. at 131, 235 N.W.2d at 602-03.
143. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
144. See id at 809 (Kelley, J., dissenting). The Cracrafi court stated:
Prior to abolishment of sovereign immunity, an injured party was left with no
right of recovery when the state or municipality was the sole negligent actor, a
result which clearly contradicted our constitutional mandate that every person is
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive to his person or property.
Id. at 808 (citation omitted). In Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981), the court
affirmed dismissal of a negligence action against the state. Justices Scott, Sheran, Wahl,
and Yetka strenuously dissented, stating: "In effectuating Minnesota's own Constitution,
art. 1, § 8 . . . there seems no reason for not accepting the abolishment of governmental
immunity." Id at 288.
Recently, in Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 1984), the supreme
court concluded that the 180-day notice requirement in the Minnesota Tort Claims Act,
MINN. STAT. § 3.736 (1982), as amended by Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 331, 1976 Minn. Laws
1282, was non-jurisdictional in nature. 342 N.W.2d at 634. The appellant argued that
the notice provision violated section eight. Appellant's Brief at 12. The court, however,
did not mention this constitutional argument in its opinion. 342 N.W.2d 632.
Most recently, in Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, No. C7-82-520, slip op. (Minn.
Apr. 27, 1984), the court upheld the constitutionality of the outdoor recreation exception
of the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act, MINN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3(h) (1982). Appel-
lants were nonusers of the state's recreational facilities whose land was flooded due to state
manipulation of wildlife sanctuary pools. Green-Glo, slip op. at 3. The statute was chal-
lenged as a violation of federal equal protection and section eight. Id at D-I. The major-
ity concluded that the legislative shield providing tort immunity for operation of outdoor
recreation areas was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of" 'the preservation
of Minnesota's outdoor recreational resources' in light of 'the growing demand for outdoor
recreational facilities and the spread of development and urbanization in the state.' " Id
at 5. The majority also concluded that appellants were not left without a remedy as they
could proceed in inverse condemnation to require the state to condemn a flowage ease-
ment. Id at 6.
Justices Scott, Amdahl, Todd, and Yetka dissented. Id at D-1. The dissent viewed
the application of the exception to nonusers of the system as a violation of equal protec-
tion principles. Id at D-I, D-2 to -5. The dissent also concluded that application of sover-
eign immunity "unjustifiably denies appellants a remedy for their injuries as mandated by
the Minnesota Constitution." Id. at D-5. The dissent stated:
The only possible reason for immunizing the state from liability to non-users
would be to lessen the impact of tort liability upon the public coffers. Such
reasoning resurrects the disavowed sovereign immunity doctrine . . . . Indeed,
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Parental immunity also has been the subject of section eight at-
tacks. Parental immunity was nearly eliminated in the 1968 deci-
sion of Silesky v. Kelman. 145 The Si/esky court preserved two
circumstances allowing parental immunity as a defense. 146 Twelve
years later, in Anderson v. Stream, 147 the last remnants of parental
immunity were abolished. The Anderson court abandoned these ex-
ceptions because they were difficult to apply and liability insur-
ance had become more prevalent. 148  In disposing of the
exceptions, the court cited Nietng v. Blonde1 149 and section eight
for the proposition that a remedy must be available to anyone in-
jured by the conduct of another.150
Although these decisions demonstrate the court's increasing dis-
satisfaction with common law immunities, they do not establish a
standard of review for determining the constitutionality of an im-
munity under section eight. While the principle contained in sec-
tion eight is as old as that of sovereign immunity, it was not until
ANietng that the court unanimously acknowledged an irreconcila-
ble conflict between these two common law principles. 15
1
in Kossack, we expressed doubt whether there could ever exist a proper basis for
distinguishing between victims injured by a private tortfeasor and those injured
by a government tortfeasor.
Id at D-4.
145. 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
146. Id. at 442, 161 N.W.2d at 638. The two areas in which immunity was preserved
were: acts involving ordinary parental discretion with respect to food, shelter, medical
and dental care and acts involving exercise of reasonable parental authority over the
child. Id
147. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
148. Id at 600.
149. 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
150. 295 N.W.2d at 600.
151. 306 Minn. at 131-32, 235 N.W.2d at 602-03. Remnants of sovereign immunity
such as discretionary immunity, which the court encouraged the legislature to codify, have
been held not to violate section eight. Id; see MINN. STAT. § 3.736 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
Instead, the court has focused on application of the doctrine of discretionary immunity.
The discretionary acts exception to the general rule of liability is designed to protect pub-
lic officials from personal liability when in the exercise of their discretion they act or fail to
act, thereby causing injury. See Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Larson v.
Independent School Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979) (construing the Munici-
pal Tort Claims Act, MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (1982)); Papenhausen v. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d
565 (Minn. 1978). See generally Note, Sovereign Immunity--Discretionary Function Exemption to
the Tort Claims Act, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 103 (1982). The court also has focused on the
public duty doctrine. This doctrine holds that public officials who perform legally re-
quired inspections owe a duty only to the general public, absent circumstances creating a
private relationship with individual members of the public. See Hage v. Stade, 304
N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
1979).
The court has not explicitly resolved the section eight implications of statutes codify-
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When these two conflicting principles have met, the court has
considered the relative weight and importance of each.15 2 The im-
munity cases which abrogate old common law immunities indicate
that the court increasingly views the right to a remedy as out-
weighing the burden of imposing liability on immune parties, in
part because of the increased availability of liability insurance.
Consequently, future litigants should continue to argue that lim-
ited forms of immunity violate section eight.15 3 Plaintiffs should
emphasize that these limited forms of immunity may pose an abso-
lute bar to any recovery.
Persons challenging statutorily-based immunities may benefit
from section eight's broad, equitable language and the absence of
a clear standard of review. Where equal protection principles re-
quire plaintiffs to satisfy the burdensome rational basis test,1 54 the
language of section eight requires that the plaintiff demonstrate
only an injury and the absence of a remedy. Until a standard of
review for section eight is consistently applied, plaintiffs should re-
quest that the court construe section eight as its broad remedial
language demands and strike down the remnants of immunities
that bar a constitutionally mandated remedy.
C A Proposed Classiftation of M'nnesota Supreme Court Decisions
As previously mentioned, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not
applied the Haney standard of review to all section eight cases.
The lack of a clear standard of review for state constitutional pro-
visions is not unique to Minnesota. 155 Nevertheless, the absence of
a standard of review applicable to all cases frustrates predicting
ing limited forms of sovereign immunity, although the issue has been presented to the
court. See Appellant's Brief And Appendix at 12, Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d
632 (Minn. 1984) (arguing notice of claim provision violated remedies clause). The consti-
tutionality of discretionary immunity was before the court of appeals in Ostendorf v. Ken-
yon, No. C9-83-1677 slip. op. (Minn. Ct. App. May 1, 1984); see Brief of Amicus Curiae at
6, Ostendorf (arguing discretionary immunity violates federal equal protection principles
and section eight). However, the court did not address the constitutional issue in its
decision.
152. See supra notes 133-51 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 144.
154. Eg., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981); Miller
Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1979).
155. See generally Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review
Under the Cahfoma Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979) (discussion of Califor-
nia Supreme Court's review of state constitution and need for restraint in such review);
Note, The New Federalim. Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 297 (1977) (state courts should interpret own constitutions).
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the outcome of future decisions or categorizing past decisions uni-
formly. Minnesota Supreme Court cases, however, may be classi-
fied as those which approach section eight as a general
constitutional principle and those which attempt to fashion a rule
of law from the provision's general language. This classification is
useful in distilling an implicit standard of review in section eight
cases.
Understanding this classification of section eight decisions re-
quires that principles be distinguished from rules.' 56 Both princi-
ples and rules describe particular legal obligations, but differ in
the character of the direction that they give.1 5 7 A principle may
be defined as a "standard that is to be observed, not because it will
advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation
deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fair-
ness or some other dimension of morality."1 58 The general effect of
a legal principle is that officials and decisionmakers must consider
it during the decisionmaking process. They need not follow the
principle if conflicting principles outweigh it or a rule contradicts
it.' 59 When more than one principle applies, the relative weight of
each is considered by the decisionmaker in reaching a
conclusion. 160
The balancing of interests inherent in adjudication by principle
does not create rigid precedent. 161 A principle approach coincides
with a view of the law as continuously adjusting to societal
needs. 162 It is particularly well-suited to interpretation of language
over 800 years old, since each century of jurists must apply the
same language to dramatically changed legal and social issues.1 63
Rules, on the other hand, apply in an "all-or-nothing" fash-
ion. 164 When rules conflict, one of them cannot be valid because
156. This distinction is taken from the work of Ronald M. Dworkin. Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967).
157. C. DUCAT, supra note 48, at 95 (quoting Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 37 (R. Summers ed. 1968)).
158. Dworkin, supra note 156, at 23. Dworkin used the common law standard "no
man may profit from his own wrong" as an example of a principle. Id
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id at 27.
161. See generally C. DUCAT,supra note 48, at 104-05 (arguing that adjudication by rule
produces a rigid and unworkable legal system).
162. See generally Rostow, Amerzcan Legal Realism and the Sense of the tofession, 34 U.
COLO. L. REV. 123, 141-42 (1962).
163. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
164. Dworkin, supra note 156, at 25. Dworkin wrote: "The difference between legal
principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular
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rules are mandatory. 165 It is not always clear from the form of a
standard whether it is a rule or a principle. 166 Courts may cite
principles to justify the adoption of rules 67 and in "hard cases,"
where no settled rule applies, courts will use legal principles to
guide them to an acceptable result.1
6 8
In applying this definitional distinction to section eight, Minne-
sota Supreme Court decisions may be divided into two primary
categories.' 6 9 The first category treats the remedies clause as a
principle. Decisions treating the remedies clause as a principle fre-
quently use "principle" terminology170 and refrain from creating
new rights or remedies. 171 The differing factual and legal contexts
in which the court has refrained from finding a section eight viola-
tion 172 exemplify its frequent use of the principle approach.
The second category of decisions uses the principle embodied in
section eight to formulate rules. Cases in this category formulate a
decisions about legal obligations in particular circumstances, but they differ in the charac-
ter of the direction they give." Id He used the standard "A will is invalid unless signed
by three witnesses" as an example of a rule. Id
165. Id at 27.
166. Id at 28.
167. Id at 29.
168. R. DWORKIN, supra note 24, at 83.
169. This Article divides supreme court decisions into cases approaching section eight
as a principle and cases distilling and applying a rule to determine a statute's constitution-
ality. A third category of decisions utilizing a textual analysis was also discussed. Several
of the textual decisions are also classified as cases which apply section eight as a principle.
See cases cited supra notes 53-61, 75-82 and accompanying text.
The court's textual approach is a subcategory within the principle approach. Textual
analyses focus on the meaning of specific words or phrases. These key words and phrases
are construed to convey their common meaning and the principles of justice expressed in
the remedies clause. The court has not used section eight's language to create rules and
has refrained from embellishing the language to reflect a separate legal meaning. This
approach is similar to the textual approach of other state courts. See infra notes 226-33
and accompanying text.
The immunity decisions are another subcategory of the principle approach. The
court has not enunciated a section eight rule governing the constitutionality of remnants
of ancient immunities. Instead, it has balanced the policies supporting immunity with the
principle that every injured party should have a remedy against the wrongdoer. See Cairl
v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
170. See, e.g., Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 137 N.W. 390 (1912); Beaulieu v.
Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907); Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58
Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894); Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936
(1889).
171. See, e.g., Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935), overruled
n, Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 514, 170 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1969);
Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922), overruled in, Beaudette v.
Frana, 285 Minn. 266, 273 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n. 10 (1969).
172. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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test derived from section eight language for constitutional elimina-
tion or alteration of common law remedies. 17 3 For example, in
Breimhorst, the court announced a test for judging whether the
elimination of a common law remedy was constitutional. 74 Al-
though the court articulated a clear test, it relied on language from
A//en stressing that section eight was a constitutional declaration of
principles. 175 Nevertheless, the test acted as a rule. Legislative ac-
tion was then measured against the rule's requirements. As the
court enunciated in Haney, if a common law remedy is eliminated
without providing a reasonable substitute or pursuing a permissi-
ble legislative objective, the act eliminating the remedy is uncon-
stitutional. The court has not yet departed from the Haney test.
Nevertheless, the court often does not apply the Haney test. In-
stead, it treats section eight as a principle. This treatment gives
the court more freedom to decide whether a legislative act violates
the remedies clause; it may measure the relative weight of conflict-
ing principles and reach differing outcomes depending on the fac-
tual circumstances and subject matter of the litigation.
Inconsistencies in precedent may result from the court according
greater weight to section eight principles in certain decisions.
Notwithstanding critical changes in jurisprudential philosophy,
the court's treatment of the remedies clause as a principle has re-
mained relatively constant over the last one hundred years. 76
Nineteenth century jurists generally considered their primary duty
to be the preservation of natural rights. Consequently, section
eight was used to support the continued existence of a right or
remedy secured by natural law. 77 In contrast, twentieth century
jurists have relied on the remedies clause to eliminate common law
immunities inherited from natural law jurisprudence.178 Thus,
while the nineteenth century court relied on section eight to pre-
serve inherent organic rights, the twentieth century court has used
it to create new rights by eliminating common law immunities.
173. See, e.g., Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974); Haney v.
International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972) (court adopted rule
that a "common-law right of action may be abrogated without providing a reasonable
substitute if a permissible legislative objective is pursued"); accord Breimhorst v. Beckman,
227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949) (former "rule" with respect to common law reme-
dies; common law remedies may be eliminated if legislature provides adequate substitute).
174. 227 Minn. 409, 435-36, 35 N.W.2d 719, 735 (1949).
175. Id at 435, 35 N.W.2d at 735.
176. See supra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 49-82 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 83-116 and accompanying text.
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Creation of these new rights demonstrates a positivist approach to
adjudication.
D. Summary
This survey has indicated that a litigant can successfully chal-
lenge a statute by demonstrating loss of a common law remedy
without substitution of a reasonable alternative remedy or pursuit
of a permissible legislative objective. An overly restrictive statu-
tory remedy may create constitutional problems, as may a statuto-
rily mandated remedy which is excessively burdensome to the
plaintiff. Any statute or administrative rule that contravenes the
common meaning of the provision's key words and phrases also
may be constitutionally infirm.
Ancient immunities, born of natural law, may be vulnerable to
constitutional attack. 179 Thus far, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has taken a rather conservative approach to the language of sec-
tion eight. Other jurisdictions have used similar constitutional
language to formulate entirely new remedies or causes of action.
The liberal construction of remedies provisions by sister states
could influence the Minnesota Supreme Court's future use of sec-
tion eight.
III. A COMPARISON WITH ILLINOIS AND WISCONSIN
Minnesota is not the only state to mandate constitutionally a
remedy for a wrong.'80 Of the state constitutions after which the
Minnesota Constitution was patterned, 8 three 82 have similar
provisions. 8 3 A comparison of judicial applications of these provi-
sions illustrates their potential as a tool for litigants. The compari-
son also demonstrates judicial confusion over the historical and
modern meaning of remedies clauses and the judiciary's role in
creating rights, remedies, and causes of action in an age of judicial
179. See supra note 151.
180. Using phraseology similar to article one, section eight of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, 36 state constitutions provide that every person shall have a remedy for all injuries
and wrongs. See Note, supra note 32, at 94 n.29.
181. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 10. The six model states appear to have been New
York, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa. Id
182. Ohio will not be considered in this survey because the Ohio Constitution's section
eight equivalent is used as the state due process clause. See OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16
(1851, amended 1912).
183. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1870, amended 1970); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16
(1851, amended 1912); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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activism. 184
A. Expression of Philosophy or Constitutional Mandate?
Early Minnesota decisions referred to section eight as a state-
ment of general fundamental principles "founded in natural right
and justice, and which would be equally the law of the land if not
incorporated in the constitution."' 18 5 This perspective has been
echoed by Illinois courts when construing their constitutional pro-
vision. Illinois appellate courts have stated that the Illinois consti-
tutional provision 18 6 is an expression of philosophy and not a
requirement that a "certain remedy" be provided in any specific
form. 18 7 This interpretation did not change despite an amend-
ment to the language of the Illinois provision from the permissible
"ought to" to the mandatory "shall."' 18 8 In contrast, the Wisconsin
184. See Holmes, supra note 27, at 457. In what is probably the most famous law re-
view article ever written, Justice Holmes wrote: "The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Id. at 461. This
acknowledgement of the authority and power of the judicial branch was in sharp contrast
to more established ideas that law was simply "discovered" or "applied" by judges.
185. Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 122, 41 N.W. 936, 938 (1889).
186. The Illinois provision states: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or repu-
tation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 12 (1870, amended 1970).
187. Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277, 281 N.E.2d 659, 662 (1972);
see People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 209, 340 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1974); Heckendorn v. First
Nat'l Bank, 19 11. 2d 190, 194, 166 N.E.2d 571, 573, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960);
Angelini v. Snow, 58 Ill. App. 3d 116, 118, 374 N.E.2d 215, 218 (1978); Steffa v. Stanley,
39 Ill. App. 3d 915, 918, 350 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1976). But see Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal
Oil Prod. Co., 338 Ill. App. 79, 81, 86 N.E.2d 875, 878 (1949) (§ 19 is a "clear mandate to
the courts, that wherever the legislature has failed to provide a remedy, the courts must").
The Illinois courts evaluate the need for additional remedies from the standpoint of
"adequacy." See Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 29, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958); Johnson v.
Choate, 284 Ill. 214, 218-19, 119 N.E. 972, 974 (1918) (elective workers' compensation law
which subrogates employer to employee's right of action against third person for injuries
from third person's negligence does not violate art. II, § 19); Hecker v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
231 Ill. 574, 578, 83 N.E. 456, 458 (1907) (statute which confers the right of supreme court
review of questions of fact on only one party denies the other party a "certain remedy").
In ancient jurisprudence, the process was reversed. A person's rights were fixed by
whether the court afforded a remedy. By granting a remedy, a right came into existence.
See Note, supra note 32, at 93-94.
188. The predecessor to the current article I, section 12 of the Illinois Constitution read
as follows:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought to
obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it,
completely and without denial, promptly, and without delay.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 19. See generally G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1969). The Illinois ap-
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Supreme Court has referred to its provision8 9 as one "of great im-
portance in our jurisprudence" which guaranties a remedy for
common law and legislatively recognized rights. 190
Although the Illinois provision has been characterized as a mere
philosophical expression, it has been cited as a basis for recogniz-
ing new remedies, rights, and causes of action. 19 1 For example, in
Daiy v. Parker, 192 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals created a
cause of action in favor of a minor against a woman who enticed
the minor's father away from home. 193 The court relied on the
Illinois remedies clause 194 and the doctrine of judicial empiri-
pellate courts have repeatedly stated that rearranging the wording and placement of arti-
cle I, section 12 and substitution of the word "shall" for "ought to" had no substantial
effect on Illinois law. Angelini v. Snow, 58 Ill. App. 3d 116, 118, 374 N.E.2d 215, 218
(1978); see, e.g., Adams v. City of Peoria, 77 Il1. App. 3d 683, 687, 396 N.E.2d 572, 575
(1979) (change does not affect validity of Illinois Tort Immunity Act); Tyrken v. Tyrken,
63 Ill. App. 3d 199, 200, 379 N.E.2d 804, 807 (1978) (change does not alter constitutional-
ity of Illinois interspousal immunity statute); Goldstein v. Hertz Corp., 16 Il. App. 3d 89,
99, 305 N.E.2d 617, 626 (1973) (change does not prohibit statutory limitations for fatal
injuries under Illinois wrongful death statutes). For a discussion of the legislative history
surrounding the change in language, see 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1972).
189. Wisconsin's constitutional provision reads:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9.
190. In re R.W.L. v. Bartholomew, 341 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Wis. 1984) (art. I, § 9 guar-
anties remedy for legislatively recognized right); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co.,
66 Wis. 2d 382, 393, 225 N.W.2d 454, 460 (1975) (finding merit to argument that a statute
of limitations deprived plaintiffs of a "legislatively recognized right"); Lutheran
Trifoldighed Congregation v. St. Paul's English Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, 159
Wis. 56, 59-60, 150 N.W. 191, 192 (1914) (art. I, § 9 guaranties remedy for all "remedial"
rights).
When evaluating legislative alterations of remedies, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has declared its test to be: "If the legislative act materially impairs the remedy, the Act is
unconstitutional; but if the legislative act leaves the parties with a 'substantial remedy' it
does not violate the constitution." Von Baumback v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 577-78 (1859); see
State ex rel. Blockwitz v. Diehl, 198 Wis. 326, 223 N.W. 852 (1929). In upholding a change
in statutory tax collection procedures, the Diehl court stated: "A remedy may not be taken
away altogether, but it may be changed or modified, providing it leaves an adequate
remedy, though less convenient, prompt, or speedy." Id at 330-31, 223 N.W. at 854; cf.
Knickerbocker v. Beaudette Garage Co., 190 Wis. 474, 482, 209 N.W. 763, 765 (1926)
(trial judge's prejudicial remarks to jury in attempt to force counsel to settle case violated
art. I, § 9 by denying litigant a "complete remedy").
191. See 'nbfa notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
192. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
193. Id at 177.
194. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 19.
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cism.1 95 It characterized the failure to provide a remedy as a re-
turn to the age-old philosophy "whatever is, is right," noting that
"[p]robably no institution has given life and breath to this thought
as freely as the judiciary. ' 19 6 The court reasoned that in a com-
plex society, courts can "hardly be advisedly called radical if they
indulge in lawmaking by decisions, or in a word, engage in judicial
empiricism.'
97
In St. Lout's v. Drolel, 198 an Illinois appellate court demonstrated
its willingness to use the remedies clause to create new remedies.
The Drolet court affirmed a lower court order expunging police
records of a minor who was released without being charged. 199 It
ruled that, under the constitutional directive of the Illinois reme-
dies clause, the lower court had "acted within its inherent power to
grant a remedy to the invasion of privacy of the juvenile involved
[t~herein.' '1200
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has been more hesitant to use
the state's remedies clause to ameliorate wrongs and create causes
of action because it perceives the creation of rights as a legislative
prerogative. 2 1 On two occasions, however, the Wisconsin court
has fashioned new review procedures when an adequate remedy
195. The Daily court accepted Pound's definition of judicial empiricism as "the
method of applying the judicial experience of the past to the judicial questions of the
present." 152 F.2d at 177.
196. Id
197. Id The court quoted extensively from Pound's book The Spirit of the Common Law.
"Anglo-American law is fortunate indeed in entering upon a new period of growth with a
well-established doctrine of law-making by judicial decision . . . . Undoubtedly . . .ju-
dicial empiricism was proceeding over-cautiously at the end of the last century." Id See
generally Comment, Tort Liability of a Parent to Minor Unemancipated Childfor Wilu and Wan-
ton Acts, 41 MARQ. L. REXV. 188 (1957) (suggesting that Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9 mandates a
cause of action by a minor against parents for tortious acts); Comment, The Infant's Right of
Action for Prenatal Injuries, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 518 (express legislation not needed for courts
to create right of action by infant for injuries inflicted while en ventre sa mere, because article
I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides sufficient basis for action).
198. 39 Il1. App. 3d 27, 348 N.E.2d 289 (1976).
199. Id at 30, 348 N.E.2d at 292.
200. Id
201. See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 290 N.W.2d 276, 284
(1980) ("No legal rights are conferred by this portion of the Constitution."); Scholberg v.
Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 215, 58 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1953) ("We still believe that the creation of
new rights is a question for . ..the legislature, a function which the courts should not
usurp."); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927). In Wik, the court refused to
create a new cause of action in favor of a minor against a parent for personal injuries. Id.
at 263, 212 N.W. at 788. Justice Crownhart dissented, arguing that article one, section
nine of the Wisconsin Constitution made the common law maxim "ubijus, ibi remedium"
the supreme law of Wisconsin. Id at 264, 212 N.W. at 788 (Crownhart, J., dissenting).
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did not exist.202 Recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on
the remedies clause to permit a DES plaintiff to proceed against
several drug manufacturers under strict liability and negligence
theories, even though the plaintiff could not determine the actual
manufacturer.
203
The decisions of the Illinois and Wisconsin courts demonstrate
the creative use of a remedies clause. 204 As the Seventh Circuit
noted in Daiy, judicial empiricism coupled with the language of a
remedies clause permits courts to respond to new dilemmas in a
complex and changing society.20 5 Proponents of state court activ-
ism have encouraged state courts to rely on independent constitu-
tional language, experiment with novel judicial resolutions to
problems, and "regionalize" concepts of civil liberties.
20 6
B. Judicial Reluctance to Fashion Rights and Remedies
Although state courts have been willing to use their remedies
clauses, they have also recognized certain limitations. The Wis-
consin and Illinois courts have refused to create new causes of ac-
tion when an express statutory prohibition limits expansion of a
right or remedy. 20 7 For example, in Heckendorn v. First National
Bank, 208 the plaintiff attacked the Illinois Interspousal Immunity
202. See D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 294, 251 N.W.2d 196, 201 (1977); Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist., 66 Wis. 2d 469, 497, 225 N.W.2d 658, 673
(1974), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). "When an adequate remedy or forum
does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due process, the courts, under the Wisconsin
Constitution, can fashion an adequate remedy." 76 Wis. 2d at 294, 251 N.W.2d at 201
(citing Hortonville, 66 Wis. 2d at 497, 225 N.W.2d at 673). In both cases, the court fash-
ioned a new procedure when an adequate remedy did not exist, but provided that the
remedy would be available only until the legislature established an adequate remedy and
forum. D.H, 76 Wis. 2d at 294, 251 N.W.2d at 201; Horonville, 66 Wis. 2d at 498, 225
N.W.2d at 673.
203. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984). DES (diethylstilbestrol) was
commonly prescribed during the 1950's to prevent miscarriages. High rates of cancer
have now appeared in daughters of women who took DES during pregnancy. Id at 44-45.
204. See generally B. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 102-06 (arguing judicial process re-
quires interpretation of changing social conscience).
205. 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945).
206. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id at 311.
See generally Note, supra note 89, at 553 (state courts should assume activist role to increase
autonomy in state law, avoid retrenchment of civil rights in Burger era, and develop re-
gional notions of individual liberties).
207. See infa notes 208-22 and accompanying text.
208. 19 I11. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
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Act. 20 9 The Act prohibited marriage partners from suing each
other for injuries inflicted during coverture and was challenged as
a violation of the Illinois remedies clause. 2 10 The Illinois Supreme
Court characterized the basic jurisprudential policy of the clause
as one which "serves both to preserve the rights recognized by the
common law and to permit the fashioning of new remedies to meet
changing conditions. '2 1 1 Notwithstanding its broad policy state-
ment, the court added a significant qualifier: "[T]his policy ex-
pression does not authorize us to create a new cause of action
unknown to the common law in the face of an express statutory
prohibition.
2 12
Judicial willingness to use a constitutional remedies provision to
create a new cause of action depends in part upon whether the
injury or wrong was recognized at common law.2 13 If the injury or
wrong was actionable at common law, application of the remedies
provision to fashion a judicial remedy is appropriate. 2 14 Similarly,
a purely statutory right, nonexistent at common law, may be legis-
latively abolished or modified without constitutional problems.21 5
209. Id.
210. Id at 194, 166 N.E.2d at 572-73.
211. Id. at 194, 166 N.E.2d at 573.
212. Id., accord Tyrken v. Tyrken, 63 11. App. 3d 199, 379 N.E.2d 804 (1978) (uphold-
ing Illinois interspousal immunity statute in face of art. I, § 12 attack); Wartell v.
Formusa, 34 Il. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) (upholding Illinois interspousal immunity
statute in face of art. II, § 19 attack).
213. See Nolin v. Nolin, 68 Il1. App. 2d 54, 215 N.E.2d 21 (1966). In Nolin, the court
declined to create a cause of action for libel or slander against one who presents a defama-
tory will for probate. Id. at 54, 215 N.E.2d at 24. The court stated that "Article II, § 19 of
• . . our Constitution has been construed to mean only that remedies known to the com-
mon law, though subject to reasonable legislative change for the public welfare, are pre-
served and may not be destroyed." Id at 56, 215 N.E.2d at 24.
214. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis. 2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957)
("injuries and wrongs" as used within Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9, must be construed in light
of the common law as it stood at the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1848).
215. Steffa v. Stanley, 39 Ill. App. 3d 915, 350 N.E.2d 886 (1976). In upholding the
Illinois Interspousal Immunity Act, the court traced the history of a wife's legal status,
noting her common law status as chattel; an 1874 legislative determination that permitted
a wife to sue her husband; and an 1953 legislative determination that wife and husband be
prohibited from suing each other for torts committed during coverture. Id at 917, 350
N.E.2d at 888. The court summarized: "As it was within the power of the legislature to
determine public policy and grant such right . . . in 1874, it was also within its authority
in 1953 to change this policy concept and to partially withdraw such right." Id. at 917,
350 N.E.2d at 888 (quoting Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 II1. 2d at 195, 166 N.E.2d
at 574); see Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967) (since cause of
action for wrongful death was purely statutory, no such right existed at common law and
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9 had no applicability to a wrongful death claim); Firemen's Ins. Co.
v. Washburn County, 2 Wis. 2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957) (remedies for wrongs not
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Judicial creation of new causes of action, however, should not
depend entirely on whether the common law recognized a specific
right. Although some jurists characterize constitutional interpre-
tation as limited by the understanding of its framers,216 such an
approach can create serious problems for jurists when applying the
constitution to modern conditions. Eventually, a constitutional
document must be acknowledged to be a "very human docu-
ment" 217 that is valuable only when unconstrained by ancient
actionable at common law but made so by statute can be abolished prospectively without
violating Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9). But see People v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262
(1954) (divorce law requiring person desiring divorce to file written statement of intent to
file complaint not less than 60 days or more than one year before filing complaint violated
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19). In Connell, the court rejected the argument that "injuries and
wrongs" referred only to natural rights existing independently of statute, concluding that
article two, section nineteen applied to rights born by legislative grant. 2 Ill. 2d at 340,
118 N.E.2d at 266; see also Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99
N.E. 619 (1912) (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19 applied to action based on statutory right to
recover damages caused by wrongful death).
216. See, e.g., Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935) (words and
phrases in constitution must be understood in sense most obvious to common understand-
ing at time of adoption); State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 400, 216 N.W. 509, 511-
12 (1927) ("The meaning of the constitutional provision having been once firmly estab-
lished as of the time of its adoption . . . continues forever, unless it is changed or modified
by the Constitution.").
217. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 330, 133 N.W. 209, 215 (1911). In Borgnzs,
Chief Justice Winslow, while upholding the constitutionality of Wisconsin's voluntary
workers' compensation laws, outlined the dilemma facing twentieth century jurists:
A constitution is a very human document, and must embody with greater or
less fidelity the spirit of the time of its adoption. It will be framed to meet the
problems and difficulties which face the men who make it, and it will generally
crystallize with more or less fidelity the political, social, and economic proposi-
tions which are considered irrefutable, if not actually inspired, by the philoso-
phers and legislators of the time; but the difficulty is that, while the Constitution
is fixed or very hard to change, the conditions and problems surrounding the
people, as well as their ideals, are constantly changing. The political or philo-
sophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next, and entirely dis-
carded by the third. The race moves forward constantly, and no Canute can
stay its progress.
Constitutional commands and prohibitions, either distinctly laid down in
express words or necessarily implied from general words, must be obeyed, and
implicitly obeyed, so long as they remain unamended or unrepealed. Any other
course on the part of either legislator or judge constitutes violation of his oath of
office; but when there is no such express command or prohibition, but only gen-
eral language, or a general policy drawn from the four corners of the instrument,
what shall be said about this? By what standards is this general language or
general policy to be interpreted and applied to present day people and condi-
tions? When an eighteenth century constitution forms the charter of liberty of a
twentieth century government, must its general provisions be construed and in-
terpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century con-
ditions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command the race to halt in its
progress, to stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes.
Id at 348-49, 133 N.W. at 215-16.
1984]
35
Mickelsen: The Use and Interpretation of Article I, Section Eight of the Min
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW[
common law precedent that serves little purpose in today's society.
Judicial willingness to create new remedies has not been affected
by additions to the language of a constitutional remedies provi-
sion. In 1970, Illinois added the word "privacy" to its remedies
clause.2 "8 Although the constitutional commentary to the amend-
ment provided that the addition gave, "for the first time, the assur-
ance that a person who receives an injury or a wrong for 'invasion
of privacy' shall have a remedy, '21 9 the Illinois courts construed
the amendment as only a reaffirmation of the common law right to
privacy. 220 Thus, the insertion of the word "privacy" did not cre-
ate a new cause of action 221 or mandate extension of the right of
privacy to currently unrecognized circumstances.
222
C Key Words and Phrases-A Textual Approach
Earlier discussion demonstrated that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has approached the Minnesota remedies provision as a mere
philosophical statement, 223 as a rule or test, 224 and as an expression
of the common meaning of its terms. 225 The Illinois and Wiscon-
sin courts have also construed the key words and phrases of their
respective provisions.2 26 Key terms generally are construed inde-
pendently of any standard for measuring a constitutional chal-
lenge. By interpreting the key terms of their remedies provisions,
the Illinois and Wisconsin courts have fashioned pragmatic solu-
218. See supra note 186 for current language of Illinois provision and supra note 188 for
pre-1970 language.
219. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 constitutional commentary (1870, amended 1970).
220. Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 833, 377 N.E.2d 126,
130 (1978) ("The common law right to privacy is reaffirmed in the Illinois Constitution of
1970.").
221. Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979).
222. See People v. McCarty, 86 Il. App. 3d 130, 407 N.E.2d 971 (1980) (criminal de-
fendant cannot rely on Illinois provision against invasion of privacy when refusing to an-
swer grand jury questions based on evidence seized during illegal search because art. I,
§ 12 did not prevent reasonable infringement of privacy); People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200,
340 N.E.2d 529 (1975) (criminal defendant had no "right" to suppression of evidence at
probation revocation hearing and art. I, § 12 did not mandate application of criminal
exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceeding).
223. See supra notes 49-82 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
226. The constitutional provisions of Wisconsin and Illinois offer redress or remedy to
"every person" for "injuries" or "wrongs" which he receives to his "person" or "property."
The Illinois provision also includes wrongs to "privacy" and "reputation." In addition,
Illinois' constitution reads "injuries and wrongs," while Wisconsin's constitution reads "in-
juries or wrongs." Both Illinois and Wisconsin provide for a "certain remedy." See ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (1870, amended 1970); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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tions to a variety of problems. For example, the phrase "every
person" has been held to include illegal aliens. 227
The constitutional guaranty of a "certain remedy" has been in-
terpreted as guarantying a litigant his day in court, but not the
specific remedy he desires. 228 Nor has the term "certain remedy"
required recognition of a new cause of action or remedy, if one was
available but the complainant failed to meet the requisite burden
of proof.2 29 Statutory limitations on damages have been unsuc-
cessfully attacked as violative of the term "certain remedy. ' 230 In
particular, statutory restrictions on the type of damages recover-
able in common law actions have been upheld where the underly-
ing cause of action remained available. 231
227. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 265 N.W.2d 148 (1978).
228. Metzger v. Wisconsin Dep't of Tax., 35 Wis. 2d 119, 150 NW.2d 431 (1967) (re-
quirement that plaintiff challenging constitutionality of gift tax assessment exhaust ad-
ministrative procedures before filing action does not violate Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9 even
though procedures are inconvenient and expensive); accord Smith v. Department of Pub.
Aid, 67 Ill. 2d 529, 367 N.E.2d 1286 (1977) (failure of Illinois Public Aid Code to adopt
Illinois Administrative Review Act for food stamp termination does not violate ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 12 because common law certiorari was available to plaintiff to permit
judicial review); cf Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co., 65 Wis. 2d 139, 222 N.W.2d 149 (1974)
(statute prohibiting certain usury victims from maintaining class action does not violate
WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9, although amount of excess interest due any one individual may
not justify individual litigation).
229. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 950, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1374 (1978), cert.
dented, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979). In Berh, the court stated:
So long as some remedy for the alleged wrong exists, section 12 does not mandate
recognition of any new remedy. . . . The mere fact that the relief provided by
these remedies [action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process] is limited, or
that the plaintiff is unable to meet the burden of proof required does not dictate
the creation of new remedies.
Id at 950-51, 381 N.E.2d at 1374 (citation omitted); see also Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill.
App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978). In Pantone, plaintiff physicians sought recognition of
a new cause of action for "willfully and wantonly bringing suit against them without
having reasonable cause to believe that they were guilty of medical malpractice . ..."
Id. at 331, 375 N.E.2d at 482. The court responded: "Section 12 .. .is not a mandate
that a 'certain remedy' be provided in any specific form. . . .So long as some remedy for
the alleged wrong exists section 12 does not mandate recognition of any new remedy." Id
at 320, 375 N.E.2d at 483.
230. See Goldstein v. Hertz Corp., 16 Il. App. 3d 89, 305 N.E.2d 617 (1973) (statutory
damage limitation on recovery in wrongful death action does not violate art. I, § 12);
Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961) (limited
remedies provided in wrongful death act did not violate art. II, § 19); Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill.
2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958) (act limiting damages for alienation of affections to actual
damages, and restricting consideration of certain elements such as the defendant's wealth,
prospect for wealth, plaintiff's mental anguish, and injury to plaintiff's feelings in compu-
tation of damages did not violate art. II, § 19).
231. See Siegall v. Solomon, 19 111. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960) (statute not prohibiting
action for alienation of affections but denying certain damages did not violate art. II,
§ 19); Smith v. Hill, 12 Il. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958) (act limiting damages to actual
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The meaning accorded the terms "injuries" and "wrongs" fur-
ther illuminates the judicial reasoning process. Modern courts
generally reason that the existence of an actionable legal right is a
prerequisite to an actionable legal wrong. When construing a con-
stitutional remedies provision, courts have restricted themselves to
"actionable wrongs" or wrongs born of the violation of a "legal
right. '232 This restrictive definition limits the scope of remedies
clauses to preclude recognition of a purely moral right as the basis
for a wrong actionable under a remedies provision.
233
D. The Relationship Between Constitutional Provisions
and Pub/ic Policy
A constitutional remedies provision usually does not pose
problems for legislation barring the exercise of certain rights or
remedies for well-recognized public policy reasons. Statutes of
damages in breach of promise and seduction actions did not violate art. II, § 19, since
cause of action remains); cf. Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946). In Heck,
the Illinois Supreme Court found that the "Heart Balm Act" violated article two, section
19. Id. at 300, 68 N.E.2d at 466. Although the act did not abolish the actions for aliena-
tion of affections, breach of contract to marry, or criminal conversion, it made it unlawful
to file, cause to be filed, threaten to file, or threaten to cause to be filed such actions. Id. at
299, 68 N.E.2d at 465. The legislation was held to have "virtually abolished" the common
law causes of action, therefore violating the remedies provision. Id. at 300, 68 N.E.2d at
466. See generally Comment, Constitutionality of "Anti-Heart-Balm" Statute, 13 U. CHI. L.
REV. 375 (1945).
232. See Welch v. Davis, 342 Il1. App. 69, 95 N.E.2d 108 (1950), rev'don other grounds,
410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951) (since it is not an "actionable civil wrong" for one
spouse to injure another, art. II, § 19 was not violated); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 214
N.W.2d 405 (1974) (since citizen has no "legal right" to hold his sovereign liable for per-
sonal injuries, art. I, § 9 was not violated); Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315
(1957) (Wisconsin Fair Employment Code did not create right to union membership over
racially-based objections of other members, therefore minorities seeking admission to
bricklayers' union did not have art. I, § 9 right to remedy).
233. See Lutheran Trifoldighed Congregation v. St. Paul's English Evangelical Lu-
theran Congregation, 159 Wis. 56, 150 N.W. 190 (1914). The court stated:
The function of judicial remedies is to redress and prevent wrongs of sufficient
dignity according to the written or unwritten law to be worthy of such interfer-
ence. There are many outside of that field left to be redressed by the condemna-
tion of the wrong-doer's conscience or social condemnation or penalized in some
other way within his environment.
Id. at 58, 150 N.W. at 191.
Courts have never taken jurisdiction over purely moral wrongs. The equitable
maxim ubijus, ibi remedium historically required that the right in question be within the
scope of judicial action. Equity never attempted to deal with obligations and correspond-
ing rights which were identified as purely moral. See, e.g., Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49
N.E. 523 (1898) (courts of equity will provide a remedy not for mere abstract moral rights
but for rights recognized by existing law); see also 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 424, at 185-86 (1941).
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limitations have survived constitutional attack. 234 In other states,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and guest statutes have sur-
vived right-to-remedy attacks,235 although dictum in a Minnesota
decision stated that historical sovereign immunity contradicted the
Minnesota remedies provision. 236 A constitutional remedies provi-
sion cannot be used to remedy poor lawyering, 237 nor will it help a
litigant whose counsel failed to state a cause of action 238 or to
234. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970) (con-
stitutionally established policy of providing remedy for every wrong "tempered" by policy
favoring statute of limitations); Neuhaus v. Clark County, 14 Wis. 2d 222, 111 N.W.2d
180 (1961) (statute allowing dismissal of action for failure to bring case to trial within five
years of commencement of action did not violate art. I, § 9); Reistad v. W.R. Manz, 11
Wis. 2d 155, 105 N.W.2d 324 (1960) (statute requiring notice of injury be given to defend-
ant within two years of injury did not violate art. I, § 9); New York Life Ins. Co. v. State,
192 Wis. 404, 211 N.W. 288 (1926). But cf. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66
Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (statute of limitations giving special immunity to
distinct class of architects and engineers violated WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9).
235. In McCoy v. Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 218 N.W. 348 (1928), the plaintiff,
contesting the constitutionality of a statutorily imposed damage limitation when suing a
municipality for personal injuries, argued that Wisconsin's Constitution article 1, section 9
was designed "to sweep away all the old doctrines and previously recognized limitation
upon the so-called natural rights of the individual .... ." Id at 275, 218 N.W. at 350.
The court rejected the argument, noting that its adoption "would indeed effect quite a
revolution in our present concepts of the rights and obligations of individuals to each
other, and of the state and its agencies towards the individual." Id Since the provision
was construed as protecting only those injuries or wrongs recognized by the common law
when the provision was adopted in 1848, a legislatively created right of action could be
curtailed, extended, or limited without offending the constitution. Id at 276, 218 N.W. at
351. But cf. State ex rel. Wickham v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 400, 150 N.W. 513, 515
(1915) (art. I, § 9 "is above and beyond any inconsistent common law rule that existed
when the constitution was framed, as well as any statute enacted reasonably applicable to
the current situation"). See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R. 419 (1928) (author concludes that
broad constitutional provisions such as Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9 do not alter common law
rules of sovereign immunity).
Although plaintiffs have continued to argue the invalidity of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and tort immunity acts under a constitutional remedies provision, they have
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Richardson v. Grundel, 85 I11. App. 3d 46, 406 N.E.2d 575
(1980) (judicial officers immune from suit for injuries resulting from acts performed in
exercise ofjudicial function); Adams v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill. App. 3d 683, 396 N.E.2d 572
(1979) (tort immunity act exempting public entities and employees from liability for acts
or omissions while engaged in firefighting did not violate art. I, § 12); Sullivan v. Midlo-
thian Park Dist., 51 11. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Maloney v. Elmhurst Park Dist.,
47 11. 2d 367, 265 N.E.2d 654 (1970).
236. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979).
237. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229, appeal dirmissed, 322 U.S. 713
(1944).
238. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 828 (1979) (failure to state a cause of action cannot be cured by alleging art. I,
§ 12 violation); Bohacs v. Reid, 63 Ill. App. 3d 477, 480, 379 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (1978)
(simple averment in complaint that conduct of defendant violated art. I, § 12 insufficient
statement of cause of action); State Bank v. Segovia, 49 Il1. App. 3d 682, 685, 364 N.E.2d
1984]
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plead properly. 239
IV. CONCLUSION
This survey has illustrated that the Minnesota Supreme Court's
approach to the remedies clause has been more restrictive than
that of other states. Because the court has only once used section
eight alone to declare a legislative act invalid, 240 its power as a tool
of constitutional attack appears limited. Nevertheless, when at-
tempting to fashion new remedies in the future, litigants may
profit from the precedent of other jurisdictions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently recognized a new cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 24' Policy
reasons and persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions were
cited to support recognition of the tort. No reference was made to
section eight, although it was well-suited as a basis for recognizing
the cause of action. Judicially created remedies may be needed
where rights have been statutorily enacted without accompanying
remedies, and section eight should be relied on when attempting to
reconcile such situations. Finally, the immunity cases indicate sec-
tion eight may be a successful theory when litigants are confronted
with various historically-based immunities.
Although the courts do not always accord a literal meaning to
the guaranty of "no wrong without a remedy," its status as a con-
stitutional mandate lends greater force to an argument than mere
recitation of the equitable maxim. 242 In addition, the historical
688, 691 (1977) (dismissal of defective complaint did not offend art. I, § 12); Bauscher v.
City of Freeport, 103 Ill. App. 2d 372, 376, 243 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1968) (failure to state
cause of action cannot be cured by alleging that plaintiff should have a remedy for all
injuries and wrongs under art. II, § 19).
239. See Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 I11. App. 3d 849, 855, 360 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1977)
(art. I, § 12 afforded subject matter jurisdiction to court for purpose of awarding child
support based on divorce decree entered in Cuba); cf. Douglas v. Hutchinson, 183 Ill. 323,
327, 55 N.E. 628, 628 (1899) (art. II, § 19 did not afford circuit court jurisdiction over
proceeding to contest judicial election because proceeding is not suit in law or equity
pursuant to ILL. CONST. art. 6 conferring jurisidiction on circuit courts in "all causes in
law and equity").
It should be noted that the equitable maxim ubifuis, ibiermedium has been termed "the
source of the entire equitable jurisdiction, exclusive, concurrent and auxiliary . J.
POMEROY, supra note 233, § 423, at 185.
240. Agin v. Heyward, 6 Minn. 53 (1861).
241. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983); see also Case Note,
Minnesota's "Mew Tort'" Intentional Infli'cton of Emotional Distress- Hubbard v. United Press
Int'l Inc., 330 N W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983), 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 349 (1984).
242. Formation of a rule as a constitutional provision raises its status to an "imperative
mandate" of the sovereign people and not merely "good advice which legislators and
[Vol. 10
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and psychological significance of the provision's language should
not be underestimated. The Illinois Constitutional Study Com-
mission considered deleting the provision, but recommended its re-
tention, even though the Illinois courts had not developed a clear
statement of its meaning.243 The Minnesota Constitutional Study
Commission did not consider deleting section eight. 244 The Min-
nesota constitutional Framers, well aware that the federal Consti-
tution did not contain similar language, obviously considered this
principle essential to the maintenance of liberty and a civilized
government. Although it is doubtful that the Framers contem-
plated section eight's use as a basis for judicial legislation, they
clearly appreciated the worthlessness of a legal right without an
adequate legal remedy. This concern continues to be reflected in
twentieth century judicial decisions.
The United States Supreme Court has largely forsaken the judi-
cial activism of the Warren Court.245 Today, its decisions are often
conservative, favoring states rights and narrowing federal protec-
tions.246 The nationwide impact of its decisions may discourage
the Court from establishing minimum rights, because such estab-
lishment halts regional experimentation. 247 Consequently, state
jurists should not hesitate to use the broad remedial language of a
state constitution to create or expand rights and remedies, espe-
cially when a federal constitutional counterpart is lacking.248 The
courts may accept or reject as they please." Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 54, 287 N.W.
238, 241 (1939) (citing Sjoberg v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Minn. 203, 212, 75 N.W.
1116, 1118 (1898)).
243. One analysis of the Illinois constitutional provision, prepared in 1969 for the Illi-
nois Constitutional Study Commission to assist with its drafting of an amended constitu-
tion, noted that "[T]he Illinois courts have never been quite sure what to do with this
section." G. BRADEN & R. COHN, supra note 188, at 90. Nevertheless, the authors recom-
mended its retention, stating:
The section in style and tone appears to be a pious, homiletic pronouncement of
incontestable verities . . . . It would indeed be astonishing to find that persons
in states lacking this constitutional provision have suffered deprivation of rights
as a consequence. Notwithstanding, the section does have historic, political and
psychological significance. Since its abolition or change may be misconstrued, it
may be good constitutional policy to preserve it.
Id. at 97; see also Note, An Effbrt to Revise the Minnesota Bill of Rights, 58 MINN. L. REv. 157
(1974) (this report of the recommendations of the Minnesota Constitutional Study Com-
mission indicated that art. I, § 8 was not considered for expansion or deletion).
244. See Note, supra note 243, at 189.
245. Project Report, supra note 84, at 272.
246. Id at 290.
247. Id
248. Many commentators have urged renewed reliance on state constitutional provi-
sions. See, e.g., Fleming & Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rihts." "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal
19841
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language of section eight was not inserted in the Minnesota Con-
stitution as a "matter of idle ceremony or a 'string of glittering
generalities.' "249 Courts as well as litigants should actively assert
section eight in future cases.
Mist," 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1984); Force, State "Bills of Rights" A Case of Neglect and the
Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 126 (1969); Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of
Individual Liberty, 35 TEX. L. REv. 919 (1957).
249. Theide v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 230, 14 N.W.2d 400, 408
(1944) (quoting Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542, 549, 57 N.W. 212, 213 (1893)).
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